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Introduction: Indexical Inferencing 
in the Naming Process
Current psycholinguistic and philosophical 
models have yet to recognize the essential 
place of semiotically informed approaches 
to drive developmental advances in the 
selection and application of names for 
things. A semiotic approach implies that 
the process of fitting name to the referent is 
more than a product of observing perceptual 
and/or functional similarities of the entity 
to be named, or determining semantic and 
pragmatic features particular to each name; 
rather, a semiotic account brings to light the 
fact that the referents incite distinct kinds 
of representations. Accordingly, repre-
sentations (with their meaning correlates) 
determine the names assigned to the objects 
and events. A semiotic model recognizes the 
critical influence of representations (names 
(nouns) as one kind of representation) 
to verify the influence of referents in the 
interactive world, even before (or without, 
as Landau, Gleitman, and Spelke [1981] 
report) direct interaction with them.
Representations which operate at early 
stages in ontogeny surface as a consequence 
of the coordination of different schemes 
at increasingly higher levels: perceptual, 
socio-ecological, and logico-mathematical. 
Children notice objects/events in predeter-
mined ways consequent to universal spatial 
representations (Mandler 2010: 33, 2012: 
427), consonant with elemental geometric 
parameters (Coventry, Garrod 2004: 46); 
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soon thereafter, they likewise confer upon 
referents more latent extra-geometric rela-
tional features (affordances). Nonetheless, 
it is the advent of naming which codifies 
many of these affordances: in the name (tan-
tamount to Peirce’s symbolic sign) resides 
many features intrinsic to the referent but 
not directly observable. Fitting the name to 
the referent (objects, events, places) then 
results from increasingly higher forms of 
constructive inferencing, resultant from the 
scheme coordination, first on the perceptual 
plane, on the inter-psychological level, and 
finally intra-psychologically. A semiotic 
approach accounts for the power of names 
to synthesize affordances unique to par-
ticular objects and event types via Peirce’s 
Interpretant (the meaning/effects accorded 
to the sign-object relation). Hence, naming 
is constructed upon a system of dynamic 
spatiotemporal parameters which names, 
referents, and meanings together embody. 
Essentially, the perceptual attributes ac-
corded with the name necessarily include 
more than the objects (referents); they 
entail inferences specific to the functional 
relationships among interacting participants 
and objects in an array (Interpretant).
This system requires implicit but de-
liberate (often unconscious) construction 
of testable inferences. In the naming pro-
cess, the inferences are relied upon, when 
a name is applied, to an object based on 
the best exemplar criteria, when a name is 
deemed to be a more fitting substitute, or 
when a vague or novel name is selected to 
characterize the kind of object, place, or 
event. Inferences which underlie naming 
can develop into more plausible hypoth-
eses if their premises can be subjected to 
the later probes. The probe is the produc-
tion/assignment of the name to distinctive 
referents, since it is the name which makes 
the categorical pronouncement. In this way, 
the truth value of names can intrinsically 
contain predicates, “bird” signifying the 
many properties accorded to birdness, going 
beyond the referent itself.
This model posits that representations 
are constructed according to a cyclical 
process of interaction and reaction (using 
indexical facilitators) at increasingly higher 
levels of system coordination and reasoning 
within discrete spatial fields. These indexi-
cal representations are founded upon more 
static sensorimotor schemes; afterwards, the 
indexical representations become enriched 
by more dynamic affordance-based knowl-
edge (Gibson 1979: 178–182). Index’s 
early appearance in ontogeny, before 0;4 
with coordinated vision and reach (Piaget, 
Inhelder 1966/1969: 9), and its role in driv-
ing increases in apprehension of affordances 
intrinsic to spatial primitives, grounds it 
in Lakoff and Johnson’s source, path, and 
goal schema, in Gibson’s ecological theory 
of perception, and in Mandler’s model 
of spatial primitives. Rather than being 
foundational to linguistic forms alone or to 
sensori-perceptual competencies alone, a 
semiotic model obviates the need for a pro-
cess driven theory of naming, initially gov-
erned by coordinating spatial inferencing at 
a sensorimotor level (geometric and extra-
geometric). Using container, movement, fit, 
force, support, and the like, serves as the 
foundation to construct categories, and the 
names themselves can coordinate social and 
logical operations at a micro level. Accord-
ingly, the process capitalizes on the matura-
tion of attentionally based mechanisms of 
the Index (drawing on the perceptual, social, 
and logical planes), which coordinate not 
merely spatial schemas on the perceptual 
level, but linguistic spatial parameters, ex-
pressed as representational categories in 
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lived experience. Ultimately, with index’s 
enhancement of spatial universals, the na-
ture of objects’ affordances is highlighted 
providing qualitative information for the 
naming enterprise.
Furthermore, the foundational role of 
indexical representations in the naming 
process supports the inclusion of other than 
common nouns in naming enterprises, cer-
tifying the place of other lexical categories 
(pronouns, proper names, verbs, locatives) 
to qualify as names for things. The claim 
that naming is influenced by underlying 
indexical processes underscores the foun-
dational place of spatial primitives in fitting 
names to widely conceived substances 
and events, since index distinguishes and 
relates object functions. As such, the early 
indexical schemes serve as the conduit for 
affordance determinations, since the pro-
pensity to remember objects is grounded in 
where they materialize, in the expectations 
of schemes to interact with them, as well as 
in the conditions (e.g., movement trajecto-
ries) which they do or do not afford. Index 
is the common facilitating element which 
embodies all of the underlying spatial com-
petencies of assigning features and func-
tions to referents, realized in: containment, 
path, motion, support, force against other 
objects, attachment to surfaces (Mandler 
2010: 33, 2012: 427), and origo (West 2012: 
286–287, 2013a).
Finally, the fact that the Index maximiz-
es attention to objects and their spatial rela-
tions provides the key to semiotic advances 
from pre-naming to naming: persons, plac-
es, events, and things. Index (as the unifying 
internal and social attentional focus-fixing 
device) represents the vehicle for shift-
ing from sensorimotor spatial schemas to 
linguistic representations. As such, Index 
serves as the coalescing factor because of 
its means to eventually encode location as 
a proposition; thus, it is endowed with the 
means to transport physical locationality 
and relative positionality into conceptual 
expressions of space, as in demarcations/
shifts in demonstrative use. As such, early 
attentional tools in the form of index oper-
ate to structure both spatial arrays and the 
experiences (assigning names to things/
events) which individuate and relativize 
spatial arrays.
The existence of spatial primitives does 
not presume a purely nativistic account; 
spatial knowledge is not assumed to be 
a priori. Rather, this model posits that 
particular spatial competencies present at 
birth guide sensorimotor, social, and lin-
guistic representations which are indexical 
in nature. Spatial primitives simply consist 
in propensities to follow an indexical path, 
to interpret parameters and boundaries, and 
to perceive spatial relationships (Coventry, 
Garrod 2004: 46, Bryant 1997: 239–264).
The Ontogenetic Path
At 0; 2.5, the motion into and out of con-
tainers, e.g., rooms, is first documented 
(Baillargeon 2004: 391–424), demonstrated 
by direction of eye gaze and by length of 
continued gaze to moving persons. The 
second spatial primitive surfaces at the 
same age are again measured via looking 
time of the blocked path (Spelke et al. 1992: 
101–107). Nonetheless, not expecting an 
object to reappear when its path and motion 
are precluded must eventually require an 
inference of density, and elasticity of the 
involved objects (Gibson 1979: 178–182). 
This, in turn, bears upon how the issue of 
force affects an object’s reappearance in 
this scenario (Mandler 2010: 36–37). Af-
terwards, the spatial-relational primitives 
of the container, blocked movement, force, 
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and the like inform reference to space in 
language. As such, forming objective in-
ferences, judgments, and hypotheses about 
whether particular objects are stoppable or 
breakable by another object, is a lengthy 
process, likely to continue into adulthood. 
However, what these spatial primitives have 
in common is the Index, since each requires 
directionality within, towards, and against 
other objects. These spatial primitives 
are enhanced by the Index even early on, 
since at 0;4 the principle of cause to move 
(self-start) becomes operational (Leslie 
1984: 31–32). Between 0;5 and 0;9, some 
sensitivity to the goal emerges, as demon-
strated by recognition of the existence of 
ends of the paths (Woodward 1998: 1–34), 
but only when the paths are direct (Csibra 
et al. 1999: 237–267). Hence, spatial primi-
tives are operational early in development; 
and Index unquestionably governs these 
primitives, and may even facilitate how 
and when they unfold. To this end, Index, 
given its attentional character, highlights 
potential applications of source, path, and 
goal primitives increasing their visibility 
and resourcefulness in impending activity. 
Likewise, Regier and Carlson (2001) give 
attention a primary place in their Attention 
Vector Sum (AVS) model, without address-
ing the representational nature of attention, 
namely the Index. 
In the case of containment, in particular, 
Index is a significant factor in establishing 
landmarks necessary for orientation within 
and without a container figure. The contain-
er may well consist in practical orientation 
within a room or smaller contained space 
such as a playpen or a sandbox. Boundary 
interpretation within the container requires 
a point of orientation within the container, 
or one outside its confines. That which is 
within the container permits formulation of 
distance from the walls; and according to 
Coventry and Garrod (2004), objects therein 
experience substantial “location control.” 
This claim is likewise supported by Hespos 
and Piccin’s (2009) findings that tight and 
loose fitting objects are noticed differently 
by five-month-olds inside than outside of 
containers. Conversely, spatial relations 
outside of the container materialize via the 
establishment of viewer (Origo) location 
and orientation, i.e., Hespos and Piccin’s 
(2009) findings demonstrate that once out-
side a container tight and loose fit is less rel-
evant, since their subjects did not habituate 
sooner to the tight than to the loosely fitting 
non-container objects relations. Interpreted 
in light of perspective-taking theory, these 
findings indicate that the point of orientation 
(container as a landmark or persons outside 
the container as Origo) determines what is 
spatially relevant, and that which is relevant 
is noticed. 
Other schemas which incorporate either 
inside or outside vantage points consist of 
path, movement and precluders to move-
ment along the path. Path schemas (which 
incorporate motion) implicitly entail a 
source, which equates to the viewpoint of 
the particular viewer; and the location of 
the viewer(s), together with the direction 
in which the viewer(s) is facing, constitute 
attentional Indexes requiring the establish-
ment of Origo in the spatial array. These 
spatial primitives are indispensable to 
subsequent individuation and analogy 
based schemas necessary for the discovery 
of names for things. In their uniqueness, 
“things” give rise to reference to any pos-
sible individuated substance, state of things, 
or events. As such, this definition would in-
clude all lexical categories: nouns (common 
and proper), pronouns, verbs, prepositions, 
etc. It follows, then, that all of the afore-
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mentioned lexical categories, despite their 
uniqueness in the name-referent relations, 
operate on the common principle of spatial 
primitives, although these primitives (given 
their relations) more obviously underlie 
verbs and other locatives than nominals. In 
view of their common basis (cf. West 2013b 
for a discussion of locative nucleus within 
object files with respect to nouns), both 
nouns and verbs are driven by competencies 
substantially reliant on inferences arrived 
via attentional Indexes, although it is cer-
tainly the case that nouns have been given 
the greater focus in the naming enterprise. 
The distinct lexical categories (pro-
nouns, common and proper nouns, verbs, 
and locatives) all unquestionably individu-
ate: charge self or others with a selected 
focus. Nonetheless, specific types of names 
individuate differently. While pronouns 
differentiate uniquely, proper nouns and 
common nouns do so with a comparison to 
similar objects in mind (although the differ-
entiation in the former use is often implicit). 
Despite the relativizing function of verbs; 
nonetheless, they individuate the direction 
of the argument structure. All of the lexi-
cal categories embody the Index by virtue 
of their particular individuating function; 
and most require (at least implicitly) the 
establishment of Origo to draw attention to 
and locate the focused object(s) or event(s). 
Pronouns as Names
Pronouns individuate in a very particular 
way. They do so as terms with little or no 
semantic content. Demonstratives are a 
quintessential illustration of an individual 
term whose use determines the focus on 
different occasions of use. When “that” is 
produced early on in the development, it 
possesses little, if any, semantic content. 
“That” merely serves to determine the ref-
erent in each context. In fact, the referents 
of “that” have little in common with other 
“thats”: all that is common to their referents 
is compulsive attention to the settled-upon 
entity. Neither perceptual features, nor func-
tional attributes qualify entities to “that” 
status. “That” entities range from: present 
objects, to coughs, to absent or imagined 
entities or conditions, e.g., smurfs, angels, 
possible events and places. More specifi-
cally, a “that” on one occasion of use might 
refer to the trunk of an elephant, while on 
another occasion of use (even within the 
same discourse) “that” might well refer to 
a vehicle present in the context, to an absent 
something, or even to a more abstract entity 
such as a constructed idea. In short, in their 
initial use, the pronouns merely indicate the 
uniqueness of the referent, not to the simi-
larities like objects. Index is alive and well 
in these uses of demonstrative pronouns; it 
is indispensable as an accompanying ges-
ture in the naming process. Without indexes 
(eye gaze, pointing, and the like), initial 
uses of pronouns are often rather vague or 
ambiguous. In fact, “that” individuates as 
an individual and embodies the most global 
category of referents possible, focused 
objects or events. Whether this form of 
individuation rises to the level of names, 
the things remains unsettled. 
Objects of pronouns possess just such 
power, according to Peirce: a brute force 
to ground their signs when the signs are 
primarily indexical. These Objects par-
ticularly stand out; they are not the types 
but tokens injecting their uniqueness apart 
from all else. As such, their signs are most 
often individuals, unless they impel as-
sociation with particularized perceptual 
or functional features of other potential 
Objects: “…tokens always become unique 
through individuation... If two tokens were 
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identical they would be one. In the natural 
world no two material objects of any kind 
are identical” (Salthe 1993: 141). Objects of 
pronouns are regularly the pieces of space, 
places differentiated from other places, but 
without spatial comparisons and clear Origo 
differentiations. Objects of “that” or “there” 
are equivocal to a place or an entity within 
a place out there somewhere (including but 
not limited to near space), not tethered to 
reciprocal sources as points of reference. 
As demonstratives and proper names are 
legisigns, and as such they are without 
easily defined means to index the Object, 
their Objects must invoke another visual 
Index to indicate them, or must have within 
themselves a salience of such proportion 
that the sign becomes rather incidental. In 
this capacity, the Object of these legisigns 
is a brute force Second, firing another 
concomitant physical sign or intensifying 
its properties to the mind of the observers. 
These Objects essentially trigger the use of 
individuals over singulars (by virtue of their 
uniqueness) and reduce the effect of the 
Interpretant to a catchall slot for potential 
meaning. So, if the Interpretant is present 
at all, it is characterized as an empty slot, 
awaiting the possibility of being filled with 
analogic features in the inferencing process. 
Here, the Interpretant exists as a potentiality 
or possibility. 
In the discourse, speech partners are 
influenced by tangible Objects that they see 
all-at-once or to memories which emerge 
spontaneously in that place; this atten-
tional enterprise requires signs which can 
individuate immediately and in as precise 
a manner as possible, namely, Indexes. 
These indexical signs (whose delivery is 
concurrent with indexical legisigns) have 
a distinctively attentional and visual char-
acter, e.g., eye gaze or pointing or some 
other directional gesture. The Object needs 
more than an indexical legisign to complete 
the referential act, namely, a second visual 
Index. Consequently, in these cases, the 
pronoun, despite its individual character 
alone, is insufficient to refer. In this way, 
the Objects of individuals largely require the 
use of more than one indexical sign concur-
rently to achieve success at singling out the 
Object from a host of potential referents. 
Signs consequent to notice of these com-
pulsively determined Objects impel the use 
of a second sensorimotor Index (directional 
gaze or finger extension toward the Object 
in question). Accordingly, objects of pro-
nouns, as individuals, need a greater degree 
of disambiguation than does the Objects of 
proper names or other nouns, consequent 
to their relative lack of associated mean-
ing. When demonstratives are employed 
as individuals, access to Interpretants ap-
pears to be immaterial (hence, Interpretants 
are mere unfilled potentials) during early 
referential acts. For example, a little need 
arises for access to prior representations 
in the process of enhancing interpretation 
of the compulsive notice of Objects; and 
Interpretants serve little or no fundamental 
purpose here. In 1901, Peirce indicates that: 
“an Index …would at once lose the charac-
ter which makes it a sign if its Object were 
removed, but would not lose such character 
if there were no Interpretant,” (CP2.304). 
In a word, Objects of individuals (such as 
Index) do not initially give rise to covert 
representations in the referential act: it is 
spatial co-occurrence with their sign which 
secures the sign, Object connection. 
What constitutes likely Objects of “that” 
in their unmarked use (when near versus far 
space is undifferentiated) is the imposition 
of uniqueness which they bring to bear in 
the referential process. The uniqueness can 
SPRENDIMAI 29D. E. West. THE PRIMACY OF INDEX IN NAMING PARADIGMS. Part I
take the form of the presence or absence of 
physical properties, curious functions or 
behaviors, or distinctive mental constructs. 
These Objects can be existents, or may ma-
terialize as constructions of volition in the 
imagination. Whatever is salient: tangible 
inanimate objects, moving inanimates, sta-
tionary inanimates, animates which possess 
skills of propulsion, individually invented 
smurfs, and the like, can constitute “that” 
Object. The critical feature for “that-ness” 
is the appeal to the participants’ attention 
at the time of the discourse. As such, the 
Object of “that” can be anything, from an 
existent within the spatio-temporal milieu 
to a less obvious entity such as a sneeze, 
a virus, a hole, or a shadow. The diversity 
of potential Objects (whose properties are 
quite dissimilar) coupled with the sudden, 
compulsive imposition of these Objects 
upon the consciousness of two parties 
(given the necessity of joint attentional 
schemes to elicit notice) account for the 
dispensability of Interpretants in particular 
semiotic acts. 
Nouns as Names
For the last century, the philosophers and 
linguists have characterized naming as 
names for things, namely, particular objects 
or substances. Early naming practices have 
been characterized as a caregiver announc-
ing the label for the object, e.g., “this is 
a cup,” while using an Index (eye gaze, 
pointing) to orient to the object in question. 
This practice obviates the use of nouns to 
tangible objects in the here and now. “This 
is a cup,” or “this is mommy” are quite rea-
sonable. It is hardly likely that a caregiver 
would use verbs, pronouns, or prepositions 
in the same manner: “this is a ‘bring’,” “this 
is a ‘he’,” or “this is an ‘at’.” In spite of the 
fact that the verb “bring” is potentially more 
indictable than are the others, more stative 
verbs (e.g., like); it still lends itself less to 
this caregiver naming paradigm, in the light 
of its less static and less parameter-based 
structure. Consequently, virtually no inves-
tigating effort has been expended toward 
these categories in the naming process. 
Although greater observable parameters 
exist in defining the physical boundaries of 
individual use of pronouns, their encoded 
meaning is initially elusive, given their 
shifting character of use, e.g., “she” iden-
tifying different females depending on the 
conversational focus. One simply cannot 
observe a “she” or a “bring” in such con-
crete way as in the case with common nouns 
in which fast mapping of nonsense terms of 
an object is assumed, or is thought to hasten 
the attachment of the noun to the referent. 
Nonetheless, concentration on nouns as 
the best or the only illustration of names in 
the acquisition process is misplaced, given 
that it ignores elementary spatial relations. 
Further, it is explored the way this narrow 
focus inadequately addresses how spatial 
primitives inform naming. 
In general, the explanations for how 
children apply nouns to objects take one of 
three paths: the “whole object constraint” 
the “mutual exclusivity constraint,” and the 
“taxonomic constraint.” The “whole object 
constraint” as proposed by Carey (1978), 
Mervis (1987), and Markman (1991) as-
sumes that children universally fit noun to 
the entire object, i.e., the noun presumably 
does not refer to features/qualities of an 
object, but to the object in its totality. The 
“mutual exclusivity” account (proposed by 
Markman and Wachtel 1988) restricts the 
“whole object” constraint to a “one noun 
for one object” paradigm (the same noun 
cannot refer to more than a single object, 
nor can more than one object apply to more 
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than one noun); the question of overlapping 
meaning to different nouns is not explicitly 
addressed. Each noun retains status as a 
whole object, regardless of the individual 
object with which it is associated. The 
“taxonomic” account (Markman, Hutch-
inson 1984) assumes that each exemplar 
of an object corresponds with a different 
noun, allowing some overlap of nouns and 
their meanings to members of the same 
hierarchy within the exemplar category. 
In spite of their collective popularity, none 
of these accounts constrain the use of 
nouns sufficiently to account for children’s 
overextensions, using a term to refer to an 
object which conventionally is not associ-
ated with such term, but which is assumed 
to fit the category given some perceptual 
or functional similarities is incongruent 
with using only one name for one object. 
More particularly, overextensions provide 
disconfirming evidence for the mutual 
exclusivity account, since overextensions 
themselves constitute the application of 
the same term to more than one object. All 
that is operating here is the child’s need to 
individuate, which underlies reference to 
a single object. 
Some evidence in favor of the “whole 
object” constraint emerges from the findings 
that count nouns appear earlier in ontogeny 
than do mass nouns: at 1;1 compared to 
2;0 and beyond (Waxman 1999: B35–B50; 
Soja et al. 1992: 101–107; Gordon 1985: 
209–242). Count nouns are first produced at 
1;1 (Waxman 1999: B35–B50), but the con-
ceptual categories which coordinate with 
such nouns appear to be understood at 1;0 
(Xu 2002: 223–250). These links between 
noun naming and underlying category learn-
ing are especially obvious in the acquisition 
of count nouns, as opposed to mass nouns 
(Waxman, Markow 1995: 257–302; Wilcox, 
Baillargeon 1998: 97–155). This happens 
because the mass nouns are less individu-
ated (“I want some juice,” [mass] “I want a 
cookie,” [count], they are later acquisitions 
(Lust 2006: 236–237). Although the whole 
object constraint fails to address relational 
constructs, particularly spatial ones which 
are well in place by the point in develop-
ment when naming materializes, its onset 
patterns offer support for the early exist-
ence of spatial primitives. The productive 
use of count before mass nouns evidences 
the primary role of individuation over clas-
sification, and the enterprise of applying a 
lexeme to a noticed entity. The issue is that 
count nouns typically individuate, while 
mass nouns intimate a similarity of rela-
tions across objects with similar perceptual 
features, e.g., “a juice [box]” vs. “juice” or 
“some juice [not explicitly limited by con-
tainer].” Whereas quantity is limited by the 
container for count nouns, such is not the 
case for the mass nouns. This increased need 
for individuation via earlier use of count 
nouns supports the early and sustained in-
fluence of the Index in the naming process, 
in that individuation (differentiating one 
entity from another, rather than one class 
of entities from others) accounts for a more 
basic attentional thrust in the name to object 
process (Bates 1976: 61). 
The argument in favor of  Index, with its 
individuating properties, as the foundation 
for naming (rather than the whole object 
constraint) is founded upon two rationales: 
1) it demonstrates a continuous process of 
pre-linguistic to linguistic representational 
systems; and 2) it foregrounds the elemental 
role of attention (both unidirectional and 
bidirectional) in the process of acquiring 
names for things. The latter illustrates the 
critical nature of attentional phenomena 
in establishing continuity between pre-
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linguistic and linguistic representational 
thought: what children select as their fo-
cus heavily influences what they choose 
to name. The earliest index (beginning at 
0;1) demonstrating unidirectional person/
object selection is eye gaze (Scaife, Bruner 
1975: 265; Meltzoff, Moore 1977: 75-76; 
West 2013b). Thus, at 0;4 the arm/hand 
coordinated with eye gaze (Piaget, Inhelder 
1966/1969: 9) constitutes a further devel-
opment of index (West 2013b); and at 0;8 
and 0;9 giving and receiving exchanges, 
together with pointing (Bates 1976: 61; 
Carpenter et al. 1998: 681; Volterra et al. 
2005: 9) represent still more developed in-
dexes (West 2011: 92). Afterwards, at 1;4, 
attention becomes joint, employing joint 
visual indexes and movement trajectories, 
namely, eye gaze, pointing, ball-throwing, 
and the like (Tomasello 1999; Baldwin, 
Saylor 2005: 123–143; Saylor 2004: 608). 
The point when attention becomes joint via 
visual indexes marks the period when the 
count followed by mass nouns is produced. 
Since interlocutors are an integral part of 
these joint attentional interactions, and since 
naming flows from a need to individuate 
with and for the interlocutor, attentional 
index likewise constitutes the major tool 
in the naming process. Thus, individuation 
(based on discrete lived experience) is a 
more fitting explanation for earlier ontogeny 
of count nouns than is the “whole object” 
constraint. The “whole object” constraint 
is merely one illustration of children’s 
propensity for individuation, it represents 
only one example of index’s influence and 
ignores the attentional phenomenon. 
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